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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
A new framework is presented that suggests that scientific progress requires a balance 
between exploitation of existing research programs (normal science) and exploration 
of new research programs (revolutionary science) Too much pluralism can be as 
destructive for scientific progress as too little pluralism. In order to make progress in 
an intellectual field one need to uphold what Thomas Kuhn described as an essential 
tension between tradition and innovation. In the framework presented here, this 
implies balancing on a knife-edge trying to avoid falling into either a “fragmentation 
trap” or a “unification trap”. The “fragmentation trap” is a self-reinforcing process 
where the exploration of new theories completely comes to dominate the exploitation 
of existing research programs, while the “unification trap” is a self-reinforcing 
process where the exploitation of an existing research program completely comes to 
dominate the exploration of new research programs. A number of strategies for 
avoiding both the “fragmentation trap” and the “unification trap” are presented and 
discussed in relationship to management studies and economics, respectively. The 
framework is finally used to discuss the type of traps that faces different social 
sciences and the way they are organized as discussed by Richard Whitley in his 
comparative analysis of intellectual fields.  
 
 
  
 
      
 
* Forthcoming in Hans Siggaard Jensen et al. (eds) 2002: THE EVOLUTION OF 
SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE. Edward Elgar. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The purpose of this paper is to define which intellectual structure best promotes the 
advancement of knowledge within the social science disciplines. A conceptual 
framework will be proposed that can analyse different intellectual structures and 
appraise how they perform in promoting scientific progress. By the term “intellectual 
structure” I refer to the distribution of activities that go on within a scientific field at a 
specific point in time. In this paper I will especially focus on the distribution between 
activities aimed at refining existing research programs (normal science) on one hand 
and activities aimed at searching for new research programs (revolutionary science) 
on the other hand. The question that I will explore is: What mix of the two types of 
activities best secure sustainable growth of knowledge in a field?  
 
In answering this question I will put forward a framework that on the conceptual level 
is analogous to Schumpeter’s thesis in the field of industrial organization (cf. 
Schumpeter, 1992).  According to this thesis, neither perfect competition nor 
monopoly are optimal industrial structures for promoting (technological) progress. 
While perfect competition is too fragmented and monopoly is too concentrated, 
Schumpeter argued that oligopoly, by securing an optimal balance between static and 
dynamic efficiency, would be the market structure that best promotes (technological) 
progress. 
 
In analogy with this Schumpeterian thesis, it will be argued in this paper that in order 
to make sustainable progress over a long period of time, a scientific field needs to 
secure some balance between the generation of new theoretical alternatives and the 
selection and retention of them. As a consequence we may find intellectual fields with 
either a too low or a too high degree of theoretical pluralism that each are confronted 
with a specific set of problems. Fields with too little theoretical pluralism run the risk 
of being caught in a unification trap (monopoly), while fields with too much 
theoretical pluralism runs the risk of being caught in a “fragmentation trap” (perfect 
competition). In the first case the elaboration, modification and extension of an 
existing research program tends to drive out the search for new research programs in a 
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self-reinforcing process. In the opposite case a field will go on searching for new 
programs replacing one theory with another, without ever establishing ongoing 
research programs that lead to a coherent and cumulating body of knowledge. 
Securing a balance between tradition and innovation therefore implies establishing a 
field with a few competing research programs (oligopoly) that are constantly 
confronted with new tensions that drive the field towards new solutions and ultimately 
progress.    
 
The paper is organized in the following way. In the next section I describe how 
productive research often emerges from essential tensions either within one research 
program or between two research programs.  An essential tension is defined as a 
problem that cannot be solved within an existing research program but demonstrate 
the need for a more encompassing program. By viewing advancement in science as a 
process of creative destruction, it is argued in section 3, that it is necessary to uphold 
an unstable “essential tension” equilibrium in a field in order to avoid falling into 
either a “unification trap” or a “fragmentation trap”. Different strategies for avoiding 
or getting out of the unification and fragmentation traps are discussed in section 4, 
using economics and management studies, respectively, as main examples. Which 
organizational structures of intellectual fields are exposed to the two traps is discussed 
in section 5, using Richard Whitley’s (1984) comparative sociology of science 
framework.   
 
2. The essential tension: scientific progress as a process of creative destruction. 
 
What is productive or fruitful research? Though disagreeing on many other things, 
philosophers such as Popper (1972), Kuhn (1970,1977), Lakatos (1970), Laudan 
(1977), Hegel, etc. seem to converge on the view that productive research starts from 
some tension, inconsistency, opposition or paradox to stimulate the development of 
more encompassing theories or research programs. Since all programs are 
constraining a theorist’s field of vision, path-breaking research will consist in 
removing such tensions, thereby creating new research programs that expand the 
explanatory capacity of the field. Tensions, inconsistencies or oppositions may exist 
either within a single research program or as an opposition between two or more 
research programs in a field.  
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 In fields composed of only one research program, Kuhn argues that scientific 
revolutions would be unthinkable without the laborious puzzle-solving activity of 
normal science. The reason for this being that it is only through the activity of normal 
science that the anomalies that eventually contribute to replacement of the old 
paradigm with a new paradigm can be identified. There exist therefore what Kuhn 
calls an essential tension between tradition and innovation in science. If there is too 
much normal science, in the sense that normal scientists ignore anomalies by 
developing a “trained incapacity” to appreciate aspects not mentioned in the 
paradigm, no anomalies will be taken seriously and no new research programs will be 
forthcoming. If on the other hand there is too little normal science or exploitation of 
an existing research program, the research community will just replace one theory 
with another, without establishing any research programs. Or as Kuhn (1970) argues: 
“By ensuring that the paradigm will not be too easily surrendered, resistance 
guarantees that scientists will not be lightly distracted and the anomalies that lead to 
paradigm change will penetrate existing knowledge to the core. The very fact that a 
significant scientific novelty so often emerges simultaneously from several 
laboratories is an index both to the strongly traditional nature of normal science and to 
the completeness with which that traditional pursuit prepares the way for its own 
change” (1970:65). While researchers try to solve a problem within a research 
program they may end up creating solutions that destroy their original paradigm. Such 
a pattern of (scientific) development where a research program contain the seeds of its 
own destruction, closely resembles the “creative destruction processes” studied by 
Schumpeter in his work on the transformation of capitalist economies.  
 
Hayek (1948) has, for instance, argued that the “knowledge problem” in economics – 
i.e. the problem of explaining how perfect rational agents can obtain enough 
knowledge about each others actions in order to reach an equilibrium solution – may 
be such an “essential tension” or paradox in the maximization paradigm. The 
paradoxical nature of this problem is caused by the fact that any solutions to this 
problem necessary leads to a destruction of the maximization program, because we 
need to introduce some kind of evolutionary mechanism working behind the back of 
the agents, i.e. the question of how equilibrium comes about cannot be posed in fully 
orthodox theoretical terms because it leads to a self-reference problem that makes it 
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impossible to explain how economic agents in a interdependent system can acquire 
perfect knowledge about each others decisions. This implies that trying to solve this 
problem within the framework of the maximization framework destroys the 
framework pointing in the direction of an evolutionary-institutional research program 
(cf. Christian Knudsen, 1993).           
 
While Kuhn with his predominantly mono-paradigmatic view of science mainly 
focused on tensions or paradoxes within a single research program, other philosophers 
of science have directed our attentions to multi-paradigmatic situations, where there 
exist tensions or oppositions between different research programs in a field.  
However, just as in the mono-paradigmatic case above, we may also have too much 
tradition or too much innovation depending upon how the community of researchers 
decides to deal with tensions and oppositions between theories (J. Holmwood & A. 
Stewart, 1994 and Poole & Van de Ven, 1989). If the researchers in a field with 
several research programs follow an isolationist strategy by continuing the internal 
development of their own research program ignoring what goes on in other research 
programs, the researchers choose to live with the tensions and oppositions instead of 
seeing them as opportunities for creating new ways of looking at the world that may 
lead to new synthesis and new insights. However, we may also commit the opposite 
mistake by thinking that these oppositions or contradictions between research 
programs may be resolved very easily by just testing the theories against the same 
empirical data in order to find out which one fits the data best. As Imre Lakatos 
(1970) reminded us, there are no such thing as a “crucial test” that immediately will 
decide between two competing theories or research programs.  
 
Neither of the two strategies above seem, however, to uphold an essential tension that 
can drive the field through a creative destruction process by extending the boundaries 
of existing theories by building more encompassing theories or syntheses. Or as stated 
by Van de Ven & Scott Poole (1988) in relationship to organization and management 
theory  “There are many ringing denunciations of opposing viewpoints, but too few 
attempts at bridging or synthesis. Hence, addressing organizational paradoxes is an 
exciting and challenging effort. It is an issue on the cutting edge of organization and 
management theory, and one that will spawn new ideas and creative theory. Looking 
at paradoxes forces us to ask very different questions and to come up with answers 
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that stretch the boundaries of current theories” (p.25).    
 
This Kuhnian view of productive science as approaching an essential tension between 
tradition and innovation, initiating processes of creative destruction, is in accordance 
with the Correspondence Principle of the Danish physicist Niels Bohr. Popper gives 
the following explanation of this principle   “ I suggest that whenever in the empirical 
sciences a new theory of higher level of universality successfully explain some older 
theory by correcting it, then this is a sure sign that the new theory has penetrated 
deeper than the older ones. The demand that a new theory should contain the old one 
approximately, for appropriate values of the parameters of the new theory, may be 
called (following Bohr) the “principle of correspondence” (1972:202). A 
“correspondence view” of scientific advance can be interpreted as dialectic in the 
sense that all problems in research emerges from tensions, contradictions or 
oppositions either within a single research program or between two or more research 
programs.  
 
According to the correspondence principle, tensions, contradictions or paradoxes may 
emerge because the conceptual framework used in a theory T1 is too narrow to 
understand a specific phenomenon.  In order to remove this tension or contradiction in 
theory T1, we may try to broaden the conceptual framework of the old theory to 
include what was excluded before, thereby constructing a more general theory T2.  A 
scientific advance will therefore consist in the establishment of a correspondence 
relationship between the two theories. Such a relationship will exist if T1 is a 
satisfactory approximation for T2 within the domain D1, but T2 correct the 
explanations/predictions of T1 outside that range, i.e. in D2 – D1.  
 
Proponents of an evolutionary research program in economics such as Schumpeter 
(1992), Winter (1975) and Nelson & Winter (1982) have all used the “correspondence 
view” of scientific advance as an argument for replacing the standard neoclassical 
research program with an evolutionary theory. Like Hayek’s “knowledge problem”, 
the dilemma or paradox that confronts the neoclassical research program and leads to 
the necessity of constructing a broader evolutionary research program, has been 
described in the following way by Nelson & Winter. “ Thoroughgoing commitment to 
maximization and equilibrium analysis puts fundamental obstacles in the way of any 
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realistic modelling of economic adjustment. Either the commitment to maximization 
is qualified in the attempt to explain how equilibrium arises from disequilibrium or 
else the theoretical possibility of disequilibrium behaviour is dispatched by some 
extreme affront to realism.” Since the neoclassical program cannot solve the 
adjustment problem, this problem then leads, according to Winter, to an evolutionary 
research program, the purpose of which is “…to develop a more fundamental theory 
that explains both the range of validity of the approximations and the phenomena that 
lie outside that range” (1975:96). In accordance with the “correspondence view” of 
theoretical advance, the Evolutionary theory is used to determine the limited domain 
D1 of the neoclassical theory as well as studying new phenomena outside this range 
D2-D1: “The qualitative predictions of orthodox comparative static may well describe 
the typical pattern of firm and industry response in the dynamic, evolving economy of 
reality. However, evolutionary analysis probes more deeply into the explanations for 
these patterns and warns of possible exceptions. Also the explicit recognition of the 
search and selection component of adjustment brings a whole new range of 
phenomena into theoretical view” (1982:175) 
 
 
3. Between the “unification” and the “fragmentation” trap. 
 
Building upon the discussion in section 2 intellectual fields often experience problems 
of securing an essential tension between tradition and innovation. But what is worse, 
besides having problems with securing such a balance, intellectual fields are also 
constantly exposed to traps that may drive them into either a self-reinforcing spiral of 
elaborating upon existing programs or into a self-reinforcing spiral of search for new 
research programs.  
 
In both cases, the possibilities of keeping an optimal balance between extending 
existing research programs versus searching for new programs or shortly securing an 
unstable “essential tension” equilibrium will be upset. In the following section I will 
try to explicate the mechanism driving each of these traps as well as discussing how 
these two traps interacts to upset any balance between them. 
 
 
 7
 Figure 2: The “Specialization” vs. the “Fragmentation” Trap 
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  Fig. 1. The unification and fragmentation trap 
 
The Unification trap and the case of economics in the post WW II period 
 
The unification trap is present when normal science drives out revolutionary science 
and the activity of elaborating, modifying and extending an existing research program 
gradually comes to dominate the search for new research programs through a self-
reinforcing process. As researchers in a field develop better and better skills in using 
the problem solving heuristic of an existing research program, this program will be 
even more used to solve new problems, etc. thus further increasing the strength of the 
positive heuristic and the opportunity costs of searching for new research programs. 
Acquiring competencies to solve problems within one research program therefore 
leads to more and more specialization within that program, making it more and more 
difficult for alternative research programs to compete. This self-reinforcing process 
may lead to a “unification trap” where all research activity in the field goes on within 
a single research program instead of being distributed between several competing 
research programs. The unification trap therefore emerges because the exploitation of 
already existing research programs gives a faster and safer return than the 
experimentation with new and uncertain research programs. The unification trap 
consequently implies a scarcity of exploratory activities that in the long run 
undermines the flexibility of the field by reducing its ability to adapt to new and 
unpredictable situations 
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 Within the social sciences, economics is probably the only field that has been caught 
in a “unification” trap for an extended period of time during the hegemony of the 
maximization paradigm after World War 2. With the development of this program, 
economists developed a more and more refined mathematical heuristic that made it 
more and more attractive to use the neoclassical research program and its positive 
heuristic and less and less attractive to switch to any alternative program’s heuristic. 
This self-reinforcing process of the “unification” trap lead, however, to an imbalance 
where heuristic progress (i.e. the development of the positive heuristic/problem 
solving methodology) came to dominate the empirical problem solving activity in the 
field. For economists that believe in efficient markets such a conclusion seem rather 
unlikely. Or as Grubel & Boland (1986) states:  
 
“Economic knowledge and human capital are sold in markets. For most economists 
this implies a strong presumption that both are priced correctly and produced 
efficiently. Any university using too little or too much mathematics-teaching 
economists should find that its graduates are at a competitive disadvantage; its 
training program should shrink and finally disappear. Similarly, knowledge that 
contains inappropriate amounts of mathematics should lose out in the market and its 
production will contract or cease”(p.421). 
 
But how is it possible that mathematical modelling of economic phenomena within 
the neoclassical research program during the post WW II period became the high 
prestige area in economics while applied research gave a much lower return in terms 
of reputation?  According to Grubel & Boland (1986), this may be explained using a 
model of rent seeking behaviour. In such a model it is assumed that there are two 
groups of economic theorists: mathematical and applied researchers, that both attempt 
to generate economic rents for its members. The relatively lower rate of return to the 
rent-seeking behaviour of applied researchers is explained in the following way. First, 
since mathematical economists have fewer employment opportunities outside 
academia than applied economists, mathematical economists as group will have 
greater incentives to seek rents in the university environment. Second, since it is 
easier to formulate objective tests of competence in mathematical than within applied 
economics, mathematical researchers will find it easier to build barriers to entry and 
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therefore to defend rents than any other group of researchers. Third, since 
mathematical economists are not facing any direct market tests like applied 
researchers, the demand for their products can be stimulated by themselves, leading to 
higher rents and reputation than other groups of researchers. Fourth, due to the 
universality of mathematics as a language, mathematical economists can build 
coalitions with other natural scientists, statisticians, econometricians and of course, 
mathematician, thereby achieving a higher degree of internationalisation than other 
subgroups in economics. The result is that mathematical economists through network 
externalities will earn higher rents and reputation that other group of researchers. 
Fifth, this dynamic process of reinforcement of mathematical economics was initiated 
in the early 1950s and 1960s. It received stimulus both from great optimism about the 
usefulness of natural science methods to the social sciences and the government 
support for the training of mathematical economists in the post-Sputnik era. 
 
While economics was caught in a “unification trap” with the elaboration and 
extension of the positive heuristic of the neoclassical research program during 50s, 
60s and 70s, the field seems to have escaped the trap during the latter part of this 
century.  While there  - with the exception of the Old Institutional Economics - were 
no heterodox traditions in economics in the period after the WW II, things started to 
change around the later part of the 1970s and the 1980s. At that time a whole set of 
theories – many with roots in the pre-war period and earlier - were marketed as new 
heterodox research traditions in the economic profession. Among those were 
Transaction Cost Economics, the Evolutionary Research Program, Austrian 
Economics, Post Keynesian Tradition, Property Rights Economics, Information 
Economics, etc. This signalled that economics had managed to get out the unification 
trap and that heterodox tradition managed to influence the type of problems taken up 
by mainstream economics. We will return to this subject in section 4 and 5.  
 
  
The Fragmentation trap and the case of Management and Organization Studies 
 
The second trap is called a fragmentation trap and is present when revolutionary 
science drives out normal science and the search for new research programs comes to 
dominate the elaboration, modification and extension of existing research programs. 
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There are several reasons why a scientific field may end up in a fragmentation trap. 
First, most new scientific ideas will be worse than the existing pool of ideas. Second, 
it takes a lot of time and experience before the positive heuristic of a new research 
program can be developed enough so that normal scientists can successfully exploit it. 
Even the research program that turns out to be most successful will normally perform 
rather badly to start with. Due to a lack of persistency in the scientific community 
many theories may therefore never be investigated well enough to become programs 
for research, before new theories have been proposed and have replaced them. The 
real potential of a theory to become a new research program will therefore never be 
discovered. And when the process - that drives new theories to be introduced in a field 
without replacing older theories - takes on a self-reinforcing character, the field ends 
up in a “fragmentation trap” with no chain of coherence through time or accumulation 
of knowledge.   
 
In some cases the “fragmentation trap” is due to a “fad & fashion” mentality that 
implies that new approaches are introduced into a field at a faster and faster speed. In 
management studies Harold Koontz (1961) talked early on about “The Management 
Theory Jungle”. Nineteenth years later he concluded, “the jungle appears to have 
become even more dense and impenetrable” (1980:175). In Organization Studies, Lex 
Donaldson (1995) argues, “since around 1967 at least fifteen new paradigms have 
been launched…on average a new paradigm is offered every second year” (p.7-8). 
Such a process of proliferation will typically start when a “value of novelty” (Pfeffer, 
1993) or a “ uniqueness value” (Mone & McKinley, 1993) that favours new ideas 
rather than integration and consolidation becomes dominant in a field.  According to 
Mone & McKinley (1993) such a value has emerged within the fields of Organization 
and Management Studies as documented from statements of leading authorities, 
editors of leading journal such as Administrative Science Quarterly, Academy of 
Management Review and Organization Science. This value “prescribes that 
uniqueness is good and that organization scientists should attempt to make unique 
contributions to their discipline” (Moone & McKinley, 1993). Similarly, Pfeffer states 
that: “Journal editors and reviewers seem to seek novelty, and there are great rewards 
for coining a new term. The various divisions of Academy of Management often give 
awards for formulating ‘new concepts’ but not for studying or rejecting concepts that 
are already invented (1993:612). 
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 However, the introduction of new approaches in both Management and Organization 
Studies – due to the “uniqueness value”  - leads according to Moone & McKinley 
(1993) to a problem of “information overload”. The more and the faster new 
paradigms are introduced into Organization and Management Studies, the less 
intellectual capacity will be available for exploiting and appraising the existing 
paradigms. This implies that paradigm proliferation will shift resources from normal 
to revolutionary science in a self-reinforcing manner. This leads to a fragmentation 
trap as formulated by Donaldson: “With the constant rush to the next paradigm the 
consequences is half-finished research programmes, as exemplified by structural 
contingency theory, where decades of research have left a literature widely perceived 
as containing unresolved theoretical problems and empirical 
inconsistencies…Reference to such problems is a standard argument for embarking 
upon the next new paradigm, but this argument can be self-defeating, precluding the 
completion of any research programme” (1995:10). 
 
As argued by Zammuto & Connolly (1984) and Van de Ven (1997) the problem of 
“information overload” – while being caught up in a fragmentation trap - may be 
especially problematic to handle for new doctoral students. They will be confronted 
with a bewildering diversity of theories that they will have no chance of digesting. 
The background knowledge of the field will be “a morass of bubbling and sometime 
noxious literature. Theories presented are incompatible, research findings 
inconsistent, and the general body of knowledge indigestible” (p.32). The 
combination of the “uniqueness value” and a very fragmented knowledge structure 
will make it tempting for many doctoral students to learn only some of the newer and 
more exciting programs at the expense of the old. In this way, the field may end up in 
a situation where there is no effective transmission of knowledge between the old and 
the new generation and where older theories are not replaced by newer theories, but 
just forgotten. Being caught in a “fragmentation trap” implies therefore that the 
historical dimension of a field will tend to get lost. Few attempts will be made to 
show how newer contributions relate to earlier contributions by expanding upon and 
correcting older contributions. Instead newer contributions will just be introduced into 
the field without facing any demand that they somehow should solve problems that 
earlier contributions had been unable to solve.        
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How tradition and innovation interact to undermine a healthy balance between 
themselves 
 
In order to secure the unstable “essential tension” equilibrium, scientific fields may be 
seen as constantly trying to avoid getting locked into either a self-reinforcing 
“unification” or “fragmentation” trap. However, there exist very complex interactions 
between activities of exploiting an existing research program and activities of 
searching for new theories that will tend to undermine any kind of balance that may 
exist between them.  
 
Elaborating, modifying and extending an existing research program tends to 
undermine extraordinary science by discouraging attempts of finding new research 
programs and problem solving heuristic that are essential for the long-term survival of 
a field. Researchers in the field therefore either tend to stick to one (currently 
progressive) program and its problem solving heuristic to such an extent that there is 
little exploration of other programs. Or they fail to stick long enough to one 
(underdeveloped and currently degenerating) program long to determine its “true” 
problem solving capacity. 
 
In a similar way, revolutionary science undermines normal science. Efforts to 
promote revolutionary science encourage impatience with new theories and make the 
development of new problem solving heuristics very unlikely. Theories are therefore 
likely to be abandoned before enough time has been devoted to develop them into 
research programs with a specific heuristic. The impatience of revolutionary science 
therefore results in unelaborated discoveries and a fragmented knowledge structure. 
As a result of the way normal and revolutionary science interacts, most scientific 
fields will have difficulties maintaining a healthy tension between them. This 
tendency to undermine each other raises the problem of what strategies scientific 
fields have in fact used in order to keep a balance between them, thereby avoiding 
both the unification and fragmentation traps. In other words what kind of 
“competition policies” have been implemented in different scientific fields? 
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 4. Strategies for avoiding the “unification trap” and the “fragmentation trap” in 
the social sciences. 
 
Introduction 
 
By arguing that self-reinforcing processes and traps characterize intellectual fields 
several important policy issues may be brought forward.  For instance, if positive 
feedback loops might lock in a dominant research program such as neoclassical 
economics for long periods of time, regardless of the intellectual progress actually 
generated by it, is it then sensible to talk about an open market for ideas? What can be 
done about the substantial sunk costs and high entry barriers that confront unorthodox 
competitors? Conversely, what policies may be recommended in case a field is 
exposed to a feedback loop that leads to its fragmentation? When one theory is 
introduced after the other in rapid succession, it will be impossible to evaluate which 
ones are good and which ones are bad, thereby destroying the possibility of having a 
cumulating body of knowledge. In this case, we may investigate policies to reduce the 
speed with which new alternatives are introduced into the field.    
 
Before entering this discussion about different strategies to avoid dilemmas and traps 
in a scientific context, I will reflect upon how these discussions should be conducted? 
Firstly, I will suggest that debates about appropriate strategies should be conducted in 
a comparative context so that we avoid policy conclusions that only rest upon 
experiences from a single field, but use data from a broader set of fields. In this way 
we may avoid the “Panglossian bias” of many researchers who view the structure of 
their own field as the only natural/possible way to organize a field. Secondly, policy 
debates should preferably be conducted on a constitutional level, which implies that 
the discussions about what rules (conventions, norms, etc) should govern a specific 
field preferable should be conducted behind a “veil of ignorance” (Rawls, 1971) or a 
“veil of uncertainty” (J. Buchanan & G. Tullock, 1962); that is, without knowing what 
implications these rules may have regarding the choice between specific theories or 
research programs.      
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The unification trap and the case of economics 
 
In the following section we shall discuss some strategies that a research community 
may suggest in order to avoid a self-reinforcing unification trap using economics as 
the main illustrative case. These strategies include a) Promoting the isolation of young 
heterodox research programs during their maturation b) Building heterodox traditions 
around core anomalies in mainstream economics and giving priority to a 
strengthening of their positive heuristic and c) Changing the composition of research 
styles in an intellectual field. 
 
a) Promoting the isolation of young heterodox research programs during their 
maturation 
 
In his “Open Society and its Enemies” Karl Popper (1945) argued that the more 
‘open’ a scientific field is in terms of accepting competing research programs, the 
tougher the competition and the better the chances for a scientific break-through. For 
the same reason, the scientific community should be very lenient towards new 
research programs, in order to make sure that they get enough time to mature, before 
being exposed to the fierce competition of older and more mature research programs. 
In accordance with this position, Imre Lakatos argued that ”we must not discard a 
budding research program simply because it has so far failed to overtake a powerful 
rival. As long as a budding research program can be rationally reconstructed as a 
progressive problem shift, it should be sheltered for a while from a powerful 
established rival” (1970:157).  
 
In economics, for instance, the maximization program has been elaborated, modified 
and extended for many years. A lot of sunk costs have been spent on this program and 
it is, therefore, very unlikely that a competitor with a better problem solving capacity 
or a stronger heuristic to suddenly emerge. New research programs such as the 
behavioural program, the evolutionary program, the new institutionalist program, etc. 
should therefore be protected during their infancy in order to make sure that they get 
time to develop and strengthen their heuristic before a verdict can be made. In fact, 
this argument is analogue to the “infant industry” argument of Friedrich Litz 
recommending that new firms should be protected from outside competitors until they 
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have grown strong enough to be exposed to the fierce competition of the world market 
from older and more mature foreign competitors.  
 
Terence Ball (1976) has raised a similar argument in political science. He argued that 
Marxism and functional analysis as scientific programs might have been killed off 
prematurely, because their protagonists lacked the necessary tenacity and their critics 
the necessary tolerance required to give these programs a fighting chance. He 
concluded: 
 
“We political scientists have not, I fear, treated our budding research programs (or 
traditions) very leniently. On the contrary, we have made them into sitting ducks; and, 
in a discipline which includes many accomplished duck hunters, this has often proved 
fatal…if we are to be good sportsmen we need to take Lakatos’ scheme seriously” 
(p.34) 
 
This implies that we should be more tolerant when criticizing a research program than 
assumed by Popper’s methodology of naive falsificationism. Purely negative and 
destructive criticism, like a refutation will never be enough to kill a program. We will 
only be able to reject a program when we have a new and better theory or program. 
This leads us to the second strategy. 
 
b) Building heterodox traditions around core anomalies in mainstream 
economics and giving priority to building a strong positive heuristic 
 
Though economics has often been portrayed (mostly by other social sciences) as 
having a completely unitary structure, today the field includes several heterodox 
traditions that during the last 20 or 30 years have influenced mainstream economics in 
fundamental ways. In comparison with the older heterodox traditions such as the Old 
Institutionalism, some of the new heterodox traditions have not been marginalized in 
the same way.  Consequently the field has recently been able to move out of the 
“fragmentation trap”, getting closer to an ”essential tension” equilibrium with a better 
mix of normal and revolutionary science. The main reason being that the new 
heterodox traditions seem to have followed a strategy that on the one hand focuses on 
the core anomalies in the mainstream paradigm and on the other hand gives priority to 
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strengthen the positive heuristic of these newer research programs.       
 
New heterodox traditions such as Transaction Cost Economics, the Evolutionary 
Research Program and the Knowledge-Based program start from the assertion that a 
purely negative critique will be insufficient in order to replace the mainstream 
tradition. What is needed is that the new heterodox traditions are able to identify some 
core anomalies in the orthodoxy and to show how a solution to this problem will lead 
to the replacement of the mainstream tradition with a newer research program. An 
example of such a core anomaly is the so-called “knowledge problem” that potentially 
may be solved by switching from the mainstream tradition to an Institutional-
Evolutionary research program. The argument is that you will never “beat” a research 
program just by identifying some anomalies within it. In order to do so you need a 
new and better research program. It is for the same reason that several new heterodox 
traditions have allocated so many resources towards improving the problem solving 
capacity of the new research programs by strengthening their positive heuristics.   
 
c) Changing the composition of research styles in an intellectual field. 
 
When studying scientific fields most philosophers of science tend to view science 
from a typological rather than from a population perspective (cf. E. Mayr, 1976). A 
typological view of a scientific field assumes that all researchers within a field follow 
the same rule of rationality, converging to the same uniform decision, and therefore 
approximates the same common underlying ideal type. Consequently, variety or the 
co-existence of a plurality of approaches will either be very difficult or even 
impossible to understand from such a perspective. For instance, from the view of Imre 
Lakatos MSRP, continuing the work on an old degenerating research program when a 
new progressive program emerges can only be understood as involving a “mistake” or 
“irrational behaviour” on behalf of the researchers staying with the old program. 
 
Variety or the co-existence of several research programs takes centre-stage in a 
population perspective. In this case, we switch to a truly system (population) level of 
analysis by asking what distribution of individual research strategies may be rational 
(conducive to scientific progress) for the field as a whole (cf. P. Kitcher, 1993). Let us 
assume that the research community may be described by different styles of research. 
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First, there is the “orthodox normal scientist” that will stick with the paradigm, 
whatever happens. Second, there is the “standard normal scientist” that will be ready 
to reject an old paradigm when there are clear indications that a new paradigm will 
supersede the old paradigm. Thirdly, there is the “essential tension researcher” that 
exploits anomalies in the old paradigm(s) in order to create new research programs. 
And finally, there is the “fashion-driven” researcher that value new research programs 
more than old research programs just because they are newer.  
 
The existence of an uneven distribution of research styles in a field, with a dominance 
of the first mentioned, will lead to a “unification trap”. In this case, a strategy for 
getting out of this trap would consist in trying to create a more even distribution by 
favouring the last mentioned research styles when recruiting to the field. This may be 
done by consciously promoting entry of new heterodox researchers into the field.     
 
 
The “fragmentation trap” and the case of management/organization studies. 
 
In the following section we shall discuss 3 strategies that researchers may use in order 
to avoid a self-reinforcing fragmentation trap. The illustrations will come from the 
field of management/organization studies. These strategies include a) Increasing the 
persistency in the research community 2) Focusing on tensions and oppositions 
between theories and research programs and 3) Condensing the knowledge structure 
in order to increase the absorptive capacity of an intellectual field. 
 
 
a) Increasing the persistency in the research community 
 
An important reason why a field may end up in a fragmentation trap is that there is 
too little persistency and too much impatience in the scientific community. Since new 
theories and approaches need a lot of refinement and development before their true 
value in terms of heuristic power (problem solving capacity) can be determined, the 
high rate of “turn-over” will imply that the selection mechanism will function very 
imperfectly. As we argued earlier the individual researchers as well as the research 
community will be confronted with a problem of “information-overload”  (Mone & 
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McKinley, 1993), since new theories are introduced into the field at a rate that makes 
it impossible to identify the theories with the best heuristic or problem-solving 
capacity. In other words the variation mechanism that produces new theories will 
completely outperform the selection mechanism. As a consequence, theories will just 
succeed each other in an endless cycle of failure and change without any real 
accumulation of knowledge. That is, they find themselves in a typical fragmentation 
trap. 
 
Fields that ends up in a fragmentation trap do rarely have a good sense of their history 
because the researchers are too busy to keep up with the newest “fad & fashion” to 
look back upon the historical roots of their field.  Or as Michael Reed (1992) has 
argued in relationship to the field of Organizational Studies:  
 
“Any sense of historical continuity and narrative coherence is lost in the clamour of 
voices announcing the ‘end of history’ and extolling the virtues of root and branch 
transformation from the ‘old’ to the ‘new organization theory” (1992:246) 
  
Furthermore, as we shall discuss below the knowledge structure is too fragmented and 
diffuse in order to be of any help to researchers in their current problem solving 
activities. Introducing a “conservative bias” towards the status quo in such fields 
would therefore be a strategy that can reduce the high “turn over” rate of new 
theories, thereby securing a better balance between continuity and change. One way 
that such a “conservative bias” strategy could be implemented is to demand that only 
theories that build upon and correct older theories should be taken as serious 
candidates for being included in the background knowledge structure of the field 
 
 
b) Focusing on removing tensions and oppositions between theories and research 
programs in the field.  
 
In cases where a field is caught in a “fragmentation trap” any attempt to isolate 
theories or research programs rather than confront them with each other will be seen 
as counterproductive. For instance, both in management studies and organization 
studies there are many supporters of an eclectic research strategy (cf. Mintzberg, 
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Ahlstron & Lampel, 1998). However, supporters of this strategy often seem unaware 
of the negative implications that such a strategy may have regarding the knowledge 
structure of a field by moving the field away from an “essential tension” equilibrium.  
 
An eclectic research strategy will often lead to a high degree of theoretical 
conservatism rather than theoretical radicalism. The reason for this is that adherents of 
the eclectic strategy are willing to accept and live with very varied – and in some 
cases even contradictory – theoretical perspectives. This implies that inconsistencies 
and tensions in the field are accepted, rather than acted upon. Consequently, tensions 
and inconsistencies in the knowledge structure of the field are not seen as leading to 
new research problems and new research opportunities, though a closer investigation 
of them may have revealed that they could have done so. Another implication of the 
eclectic type of research strategy is that the members of the research community will 
find it more and more difficult to communicate with each other the more theories that 
are introduced and the further they get stuck in the fragmentation trap.  
 
The only way to reverse this tendency towards a fragmentation trap is therefore to 
give up the eclectic research strategy and instead focus on removing tensions and 
opposition between theories and research programs. This necessitates continuous 
investments in research that tries to solve all kinds of conceptual problems that 
emerge as contradictions or tensions between the different parts of the knowledge 
structure. Since these conceptual problems (and the kind of foundational research that 
is implied) are often looked upon as second order problems, they are not considered 
as important to solve as empirical problems.  
 
c) Condensing the knowledge structure in order to increase the absorptive 
capacity of an intellectual field. 
 
A continuous accumulation of new theories and methods in a field will sooner or later 
create a complexity crisis, because the knowledge structure will become too diffuse 
and disintegrated. Adding new layers of knowledge in a field, without at the same 
time trying to “condense” the knowledge structure by ordering/mapping the different 
theoretical contributions, will sooner or later lead to severe inefficiencies that reduce 
the absorptive capacity of an intellectual field. Or as Jeffrey Pfeffer (1982) states in 
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relationship to the field of organization studies: “There are thousands of flowers 
blooming, but nobody does any manicuring or tending” (p.1).  In a field that is 
exposed to such a “fragmentation trap” the researchers will therefore experience that 
they have difficulties in “standing on the shoulders of their predecessors”, because 
there is no real structure of knowledge to start from.”  
    
One way to reverse this self-reinforcing tendency toward a “fragmentation trap” is to 
make investments in structuring the background knowledge of the field. That is, 
changing the balance between continuity and change by moving resources from the 
latter to the former. This may be done, for instance, by using resources to map the 
existing theoretical contributions within a field, by identifying the main dimensions 
along which they differ, by specifying the formal and substantial relationships 
between individual contributions, by identifying important oppositions between 
different contributions, etc. In organization and management studies, examples of 
such contributions are Burell & Morgan (1979), Astley & Van de Ven (1983), Pfeffer 
(1982), W.R. Scott (1982), etc. Structuring the background knowledge of a field in 
this way will make it more likely to be used in future problem solving activities. It 
will therefore be a strategy for increasing the absorptive capacity of a field. It will also 
increase the chances for finding more encompassing theories that may further reduce 
the fragmentation of a field.   
 
Working on “condensing” the knowledge structure in a field may have significant 
efficiency implications, since this determines to a large degree the production time for 
new knowledge contributions. If the knowledge structure is very complex, consisting 
of many layers of old knowledge that has only been condensed to some degree, the 
production time of new contributions is relatively high. One direct way to measure or 
estimate this “production time” is to find out how much time a newcomer to the field 
needs to recapitulate the history of the field, in order for him or her to make a new 
knowledge contribution. The idea that a new member of a scientific field 
“recapitulates” in a condensed version the evolution of the field goes back to the 
thesis that “ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny” in biology. This thesis states that every 
new member of a species recapitulates in a condensed way the evolution of the whole 
species. In a scientific context, according to Herbert Simon (1962), this thesis states 
that every new member of a scientific field will recapitulate – in a very condensed 
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way – the historical evolution of the field, in order to make a new knowledge 
contribution.  
 
In fields where a lot of resources have been spent on formalizing and thereby 
condensing the knowledge structure, the production time and the age of new 
contributors may be lower than in fields where this is not the case. However, 
investments in removing tensions and oppositions, thereby keeping the knowledge 
structure relatively simple and manageable are primarily done in order to increase the 
absorptive capacity of the researchers within the field (cf. Cohen & Levinthal, 1990); 
that is, to secure long-term scientific progress in the field. 
 
5. The “unification” vs. “fragmentation” trap in fragmented adhocracies, 
polycentric oligarchies and partitioned bureaucracies. 
 
In the following section I will show how the discussion of the unification trap vs. the 
fragmentation trap fits into Richard Whitley’s (1984) discussion of the intellectual 
organization of scientific fields.  Whitley’s argues that it is possible to identify very 
different modes of how scientific fields are organized as reputational systems based 
on the following two dimensions: 1) degree of interdependency and 2) degree of task 
uncertainty.  
 
The degree of interdependency refers to how many researchers in a field are 
dependent on each other to obtain reputation. The more applied a field is, the more 
open it will be towards its environment and the less interdependency there will be. 
Conversely, the more basic a science is, the more researchers have to rely on each 
other for obtaining reputations. The degree of task uncertainty refers to the degree of 
uncertainty a researcher faces when trying to solve a specific problem. It is normally 
claimed that the main function of science is to produce new knowledge. What is 
accepted as new knowledge depends to a large extent on the background knowledge 
of the field. As I argued in section 4, the more systematic, exact and general this 
knowledge is, the easier it is to determine whether a contribution is new or not and 
how well this contribution fits into the background knowledge of the field. If the 
background knowledge is well structured, which is the case for mono-paradigmatic 
fields, the task uncertainty will be low. Whitley (1984) furthermore distinguishes 
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between two different aspects of task uncertainties, technical and strategic. Technical 
uncertainty refers to the degree of unpredictability and variability that exist, in a field 
with regard to the methods and procedures for solving empirical problems. If there 
exists many different methods and if it is difficult to interpret the (test) results in a 
field, the degree of technical uncertainty is high. On the other hand, if a certain 
method has been canonized as being the only legitimate method in a field, the degree 
of technical task uncertainty is low. Strategic uncertainty, on the other hand, refers to 
the degree to which researchers agree upon which problems are important, less 
important, etc. and what goals should govern their research. In fields with a high 
degree of strategic task uncertainty, researchers will be confronted with many 
different problems, the relevance and importance of which are appraised very 
differently. 
 
According to Whitley, variations in these two contingency variables make it possible 
to distinguish between at least seven different configurations of how scientific fields 
are organized. However, since we are primarily interested in the social sciences, the 
discussion here will be limited to the three configurations found in this area. These 
include the “fragmented adhocracy”, the “polycentric oligarchy” and the “partitioned 
bureaucracy”. 
 
 
 Degree of Interdependency 
Degree of Strategic Task 
Uncertainty 
Low High 
High Fragmented Adhocracy Polycentric Oligarchy 
Low Unstable form Partitioned Bureaucracy 
 
Figure 2: Reputational Organizations in the Social Sciences 
 
Social science fields such as sociology, management studies, anthropology, political 
science, etc. have rarely been dominated by a single paradigm, as is the case for some 
natural sciences. We should therefore expect that these fields have a substantially 
higher degree of technical and strategic uncertainty. The only social science that has 
diverged from this pattern is economics, which for a long period, has been dominated 
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by the (neoclassical) maximization paradigm and therefore has a substantially lower 
degree of strategic task uncertainty and a higher degree of interdependency than the 
other social sciences. According to Richard Whitley (1983), the reputational 
configuration of economics may be characterized as partitioned bureaucracy. 
 
As a partitioned bureaucracy, economics consists of a core with pure and abstract 
theorizing (within the maximization paradigm) and a number of peripheral sub-fields 
of applied research. Due to the absence of control over the object of research and the 
ambiguity of empirical testing in the social sciences, any unifying theoretical 
framework in a social science will be under a permanent threat to be replaced. In 
economics, however, this problem was solved by partitioning the core of pure theory 
with formal mathematical modelling from the applied and empirical research in the 
peripheral areas. Compared to other ways of organizing social science fields, 
economics has a very hierarchical type of reputational organization, since research in 
the core of the field is viewed as much more prestigious than the applied research in 
the sub-fields. The term ‘partitioned” in partitioned bureaucracy refers to the absence 
of feedback from the applied research in the periphery to the pure theory in the core, 
i.e. the abstract models of the maximization paradigm have been “immunized” from 
“potential falsifications” arising in the applied field. 
 
The second type of organizational configuration found in the social sciences, 
according to R. Whitley (1984) is the polycentric oligarchy. Examples of this 
structure are classical continental sociology, British social anthropology and as I have 
argued in a recent paper Organization Theory in the US after 1975 (cf. Christian 
Knudsen, 2003). The polycentric oligarchy emerges when relatively small groups of 
researchers gain control over critical resources such as positions and journal access. 
But since the degree of task uncertainty is very high, their control can only be 
exercised locally and personally, resulting in the establishment of several independent 
centres. In Organization Theory these centres were formed around the main research 
programs that emerged in the late 1970s such as population ecology, transaction cost 
economics, institutional theory and resource dependency theory. Within each of the 
research centres formed around these research programs, there was a relatively strong 
hierarchical reputational organization due to a consensus of what was the basic 
framework to be used, what were the important problems to be solved and how 
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reputation should be allocated within the “specialized” research community. 
However, there was very little coordination and cooperation between the centres, and 
an intense competition in order to gain control over the whole field. Consequently the 
field became balkanised into a set of more or less autonomous centres, each pursuing 
their own research agenda, with minimal interaction and communication. 
 
The fragmented adhocracy that may be found in management studies (Whitley, 
1984a) is characterized by a low degree of interdependency between researchers, 
which implies a rather loose research organization. Since researchers are facing few 
restrictions regarding the choice of theoretical framework and choice of method, the 
degree of technical and strategic task uncertainty is very high. This implies a 
relatively fragmented knowledge structure and the structure of much disagreement 
about the relative importance of different problems to be solved by the field. As a 
result, the problem solving activity within the field takes place in a rather arbitrary 
and ad hoc manner, with limited attempts to integrate new solutions with the existing 
structure of knowledge. 
 
But how does the framework presented in this paper fit into Whitley’s comparative 
analysis of intellectual fields? There seems to exist a very simple answer to this 
question following from the discussion above. If a field is very hierarchical in its 
reputational organization, which is the case for the partitioned bureaucracy (low 
degree of strategic task uncertainty and a high degree of interdependency), the field 
will typically be struggling to avoid or get out of a “unification trap”. If the field, on 
the other hand, has a very flat reputational configuration which is the case for 
fragmented adhocracies (high degree of task uncertainty and low degree of 
interdependency) the field will be struggling to avoid or get out of a “fragmentation 
trap”. Fields with an organizational structure that is situated between these two 
extremes such as the polycentric oligarchy will on the other hand be closer to 
maintaining an unstable “essential tension” equilibrium between tradition and 
innovation or a balance between elaborating existing research programs and searching 
for new programs. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
Philosophers of science such as Karl Popper (1945) have argued that the more diverse 
or pluralistic a field becomes the tougher the competition will be and the better will 
the chances for a scientific break-through be.  In this paper I have argued that such a 
policy prescription between the degree of pluralism and scientific progress need not 
be generally valid across all fields. In accordance with the Schumpeterian thesis in 
competition policy, more pluralism may have positive as well as negative 
consequences for scientific advance in a field, depending upon how far the field is 
from the unstable “essential tension” equilibrium. If a field is already caught in a 
“fragmentation trap” a policy of pluralism will be counterproductive, since it will just 
lead to more and not less fragmentation. If the field, on the other hand, has been 
caught in a “unification trap” a policy of increasing theoretical pluralism may have a 
positive effect. The structure of a scientific field that best seems to avoid both the 
“fragmentation trap” and the “unification trap” is the polycentric oligarchy. 
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